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THE THALIDOMIDE TRAGEDY AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
By Kaylee J. Rice 
 
The mid-twentieth century was a uniquely optimistic time.  Both 
world wars were over, and nations across the globe were starting to gain 
their footing once again.  Nuclear technology had created a new terror, 
but seemingly boundless new potential as well. Just a few decades prior, 
the discovery of penicillin and subsequent related antibiotics had greatly 
reduced the number of people who died of bacterial diseases.  The rest of 
the medical world followed suit, with new “wonder drugs” entering the 
market every day, promising to fix every imaginable ailment.  However, 
one of these drugs would be remembered not for the suffering it 
alleviated, but for the devastation it caused: thalidomide.  Ultimately, the 
thalidomide tragedy forced the United States to realize that, although 
they had narrowly averted disaster this time, in the future they would not 
be so lucky unless they created stricter regulations for drugs.    
First, however, it is necessary to understand the history of 
thalidomide itself.  Thalidomide was first synthesized by a Swedish drug 
company in 1954 as a tranquilizer.  When they tested it on lab animals, 
though, the drug did not appear to have a sedative effect, and so they 
discarded it and started over.1  That same year, a company in West 
Germany called Chemie Grunenthal picked it up, hoping to market it as 
an anti-convulsant for epileptics.  However, they discovered that, while 
thalidomide made a poor anti-convulsant, it had a sedative effect on 
humans that it did not have on lab animals.2 By 1960, Grunenthal was 
selling thalidomide under the name Contergan, and its popularity took 
off.  Helen Taussig, author for Scientific American, writes that Contergan 
was used for almost anything, most notably as an anti-emetic for morning 
                                                 
1 Helen B. Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” Scientific American 
207, no. 3 (August 1962):  30. 
 2 Ibid.  
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sickness and as a tranquilizer to help pregnant women get a good night’s 
sleep.2  Its popularity came largely because of its reputation as a “safe” 
tranquilizer—unlike barbiturates, another popular sedative at the time, 
doctors in the 1950s and 60s thought that the body did not absorb 
thalidomide, meaning it did not carry the risk of accidental overdose or of 
being used as a means of suicide, like barbiturates did.3  Advertisements 
for Contergan and other thalidomide-based drugs boasted that it was 
“non-toxic” and had “no known toxicity.”4  
But was this “wonder drug” really as harmless as the drug 
manufacturers liked to claim?  The first indication that something was 
not right came during the fall and winter of 1960-1961, when long-time 
thalidomide users started to report symptoms of polyneuritis:  
specifically, of tingling hands and thumb atrophy.5  Alarmingly, these 
symptoms could take a long time to go away. One doctor, Dr. J.A. 
Simpson from Edinburgh, wrote to The British Medical Journal to state 
that his patients who experienced polyneuritis due to Thalidomide at the 
time of his original letter (published January 28, 1961) were still 
experiencing symptoms in November, ten months later.6  By April, 1961, 
these reports were numerous enough that West Germany made Contergan 
available by prescription only (it had formerly been an over-the-counter 
drug in West Germany, although a prescription was required in all other 
                                                 
2 Ibid.  
3 Linda Bren, “Frances Oldham Kelsey,” FDA Consumer 35, no. 2 
(March/April 2001):  24. 
4 “Simple Thalidomide Historical Timeline,” The Thalidomide Society, 
accessed December 1, 2018, https://www.thalidomidesociety.org/thalidomide-
timeline/.   
5 Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” 30.  
6 Eric C.O. Jewesbury, Denis Burley, J.A. Simpson, T.N. Rudd, and 
R.N. Greenhalgh, “Neuropathy After Thalidomide (‘Distaval’),” The British 
Medical Journal 2, no. 5262 (Nov. 1961):  1286. 
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countries where it was for sale).7  Aside from this seemingly minor 
complaint, thalidomide was considered to be completely safe.    
Unfortunately for thousands of families, peripheral neuritis 
would soon take the backseat to a much more severe and dramatic side 
effect.  As the spring of 1961 turned into summer, doctors all over 
Germany began to notice a disturbing trend:  more and more babies were 
being born with a condition called phocomelia, a deformity involving 
shortening of the long bones of the arms and legs, often creating the 
appearance that the patient’s hands and feet are attached directly to their 
shoulders or hips.  Typically, phocomelia is very rare—there were only 
12 recorded cases in West Germany in all of 1959.  In contrast, by the 
middle of the summer of 1961, hundreds of babies across Germany had 
been born with this condition.8  Doctors everywhere were scrambling to 
track down some sort of cause for this sudden outbreak.  Two German 
physicians, W. Kosenow and R.A. Pfeiffer, frantically studied the 
affected babies to see if they could find a common genetic factor, but 
they could not.  Ultimately, they decided that the problem was caused by 
the babies’ mothers being exposed to a teratogen between the third and 
sixth weeks of pregnancy, when the arm and leg buds of the fetus are just 
beginning to form.9  Even with this discovery, Kusenow and Pfeiffer 
were unable to identify exactly what the teratogen was.  A wide variety 
of possibilities were suggested, including nuclear fallout.10  
Meanwhile, another German doctor, Widukind Lenz, was 
sending out lengthy questionnaires to the parents of affected babies, 
asking about any possible cause he could think of.  At first, there seemed 
to be no common factor.  However, when 20% of the patients he 
surveyed reported taking Contergan during their pregnancy, Lenz 
                                                 
7 Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” 30.   
8 Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” 29. 
9 Ibid., 30. 
10 Ibid.  
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realized that he might have found the mysterious teratogen.11  He sent out 
another questionnaire asking specifically about Contergan usage, and this 
time 50% of his patients could confirm without a doubt that they had 
taken Contergan; apparently, the drug was considered to be so harmless 
that they hadn’t even thought of mentioning it on the first survey.12  
Having found a strong association between Contergan and the 
sudden phocomelia outbreak, Lenz took immediate action.  On 
November 15, 1961, he warned Chemie Grunenthal about the correlation 
between thalidomide and infant deformities, recommending that they 
take it off the market immediately.13  On November 20, at the annual 
pediatricians’ meeting in Dusseldorf, Germany, Lenz announced that he 
had discovered an association between a popular drug and the increased 
incidence of phocomelia, although he did not name the drug specifically.  
However, by the end of the meeting, so many physicians had approached 
him to ask if he was talking about Contergan that it was generally known 
which drug he meant.14  
Other doctors were slowly but surely coming to the same 
realization.  On November 27, 1961, an Australian physician, W.G. 
McBride, alerted the Australian branch of the British company Distiller’s 
Limited that their version of a thalidomide-containing drug (called 
Distaval in the U.K.) was associated with birth defects.15  McBride also 
published an article containing his findings in the medical journal The 
Lancet, sparking discussion about the drug across the worldwide medical 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 31.  
12 Ibid.   
13 Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” 31.  
14 Ibid., 31. 
15 Ibid. 
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community.16  One day after McBride alerted Distillers Limited of his 
findings, Chemie Grunenthal officially removed Contergan from sale in 
Germany.17  
For thousands of families, though, this action came too late.  
Thalidomide had spread to dozens of different countries under a variety 
of names—Contergan in Germany; Distaval in Britain, Australia, and 
New Zealand; Softenon in Portugal; Talimol in Canada; and Kevadon in 
the United States.18  Overall, more than 10,000 children in 46 different 
countries were born with birth defects resulting from thalidomide, a 
condition which would soon come to be known as “the thalidomide 
syndrome”.19    
The thalidomide syndrome varied in its intensity.  The most 
notable symptom was phocomelia, especially of the arms, with the 
radius, ulna, and occasionally the humerus being entirely absent.20  
Classic phocomelia cases typically affected only one arm, but in cases 
brought on by thalidomide, the damage was nearly always bilateral, 
affecting both arms and sometimes the legs as well.  If the legs were 
affected, deformities of the pelvis and femur often caused the feet to 
splay outward as well.21  Other common symptoms included flattened 
noses, facial paralysis, internal deformities, and hemangomia, or 
“strawberry-marks” on the face (although these were usually temporary 
and harmless).22  Thankfully, despite these severe physical defects,  
                                                 
16 “Simple Thalidomide Historical Timeline,” The Thalidomide 
Society, accessed December 1, 2018, 
https://www.thalidomidesociety.org/thalidomide-timeline/.   
17 Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” 31. 
18 Ibid., 30. 
19 Nancy Kriplen, “The Heroine of the FDA,” Discover 38, no. 2 
(March 2017).  
20 Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” 30.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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“thalidomide babies,” as they came to be known, were almost always of 
normal intelligence.23  One-third had such severe deformities that they 
died soon after birth, but the two-thirds of thalidomide babies who 
survived had normal life expectancy.24    
Most baffling to doctors, though, was the seeming lack of 
association between the amount of thalidomide taken by the mother and 
the severity of the child’s condition.  Taussig, writing during the crisis, 
states that, “there is apparently no relation between the amount of the 
drug ingested and the severity of the malformation. A single dose of 100 
milligrams appears to be enough to cause severe phocomelia, yet in other 
instances the same doses may produce only a mild abnormality.”25  
Eventually, Lenz came to the realization that this was because of the 
limited time in which thalidomide affected the fetus:  deformities would 
only occur if thalidomide was taken between the 38th and 42nd day of 
pregnancy.26  Therefore, large amounts of thalidomide taken earlier or 
later than this limited window would not cause birth defects, while small 
amounts taken during this time could result in a severe case of 
thalidomide syndrome.  
However, one major world power had remarkably few 
thalidomide babies: compared to hundreds or thousands of thalidomide 
babies born in other countries where thalidomide was for sale, the United 
States had only 17 confirmed cases of thalidomide syndrome.27  It would 
be easy to assume that this was because the United States had the most 
stringent drug regulation laws, but this wasn’t true.  The real reason that 
the United States managed to avoid a large-scale thalidomide tragedy 
was the tireless work of one woman:  Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey.  
                                                 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid., 32.  
26 Ibid., 32.  
27 Taussig, “The Thalidomide Syndrome,” 30.  
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Kelsey was born on Vancouver Island, Canada, in 1914.  She 
was schooled in both Canada and England, showing a strong inclination 
toward the sciences from an early age, eventually going on to earn her 
PhD in pharmacology from the University of Chicago in 1938.28  As a 
woman in the medical field, she had to deal with many difficulties as her 
career advanced.  For example, when she applied to the University of 
Chicago’s doctorate program (and, simultaneously, for a position as a 
research assistant), Dr. Geiling, the program director, addressed her 
acceptance letter to “Mr. Oldham.”  Rather than correcting him, Kelsey 
decided to show up and let him discover his mistake for himself.29    
During her time at the University of Chicago, Kelsey and Geiling 
participated in a research program that sought to find a synthetic version 
of quinine, an anti-malarial drug.  Although they never accomplished this 
goal, Kelsey made an interesting discovery:  pregnant rabbits were 
significantly less able to process quinine than normal rabbits, and 
embryonic rabbits were unable to process it at all.30  Unbeknownst to 
Kelsey (or anyone else, for that matter) was the way that this discovery 
would later inform the most notable accomplishment of her career:  
keeping thalidomide from being sold commercially in the United States.  
After graduating from the University of Chicago, Kelsey worked 
for the  Journal of the American Medical Association (or JAMA for 
short) as an editorial assistant.  Her job was to confirm the scientific 
accuracy of articles submitted to the journal for publication.31 This led to 
a job as a medical examiner at the FDA.  Specifically, Kelsey worked for 
the branch of the FDA that regulated and approved new drugs.  Once an 
                                                 
28 Kriplen, “The Heroine of the FDA.”  
29 Leila McNeill, “The Woman Who Stood Between America and a 
Generation of ‘Thalidomide Babies’:  How the United States Escaped a National 
Tragedy in the 1960s,” Smithsonian Magazine, May 8, 2017.  
30 Bren, “Frances Oldham Kelsey,” 24.  
31 Nancy Kriplen, “The Heroine of the FDA,” Discover 38, no. 2 
(March 2017).   
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NDA (New Drug Application) was submitted for approval, three 
people—a chemist, a pharmacologist, and a medical officer.  As the 
medical officer in this process, Kelsey’s job was to determine whether 
the studies submitted to prove the drug’s safety were valid or not.32  
Kelsey’s first project in this position came to her desk in September, 
1960.  It was an application for the sale of a thalidomide-containing drug 
called Kevadon, which the William S. Merrell company was hoping to 
market in the United States.  The FDA gave this to Kelsey as her first job 
because they thought it would be an easy approval, given the popularity 
other thalidomide-containing drugs already enjoyed in other countries.33  
Looking back, Kelsey would later comment, “As it turned out, it wasn’t 
all that easy.”34  
In the 1950s and 60s, the process for approving a new drug was 
heavily skewed in favor of the drug companies.  First of all, the FDA 
could only regulate the safety of a drug, not its efficacy.35  Therefore, a 
drug with no ill effects that did absolutely nothing could claim to be the 
cure for all sorts of ills, and there was nothing the FDA could do.  
Additionally, if no objections were raised against the new drug, it would 
be automatically approved for sale after 60 days, even if no one had 
technically approved it.36  Because of this, most drugs were approved as 
long as there were no glaringly obvious side effects.  However, this was 
not to be the case with Kevadon.  
In looking at the Merrell company’s submission, several red 
flags appeared to Kelsey.  First of all, the clinical studies designed to 
                                                 
32 Ibid.  
33 Robert D. McFadden, “Frances Oldham Kelsey, Who Saved U.S. 
Babies from Thalidomide, Dies at 101,” The New York Times, August 7, 2015.    
34 Bren, “Frances Oldham Kelsey,” 24.   
35 “Government Actions in Times of Crisis:  Lessons from the History 
of Drug Regulation,” Journal of Social History 18, no. 3 (Spring 1985):  5-6.   
36 Ibid., 5.  
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prove the drug’s safety were incomplete.  Second (and possibly more 
concerning), Kelsey realized that “many of the submissions from doctors 
(she recognized a few of the names from questionable JAMA papers) 
read more like advertising testimonials than well-designed, well-executed 
scientific studies.”37  Because of these flaws, she returned the submission 
to the Merrell Company, asking for more information before she could 
approve the drug.  Meanwhile, she decided to do some extra reading on 
thalidomide to see what other medical professionals were saying about 
the drug.  To her surprise, she read in the British Medical Journal that 
with long-term use, it was found to cause peripheral neuritis—a side 
effect that William Merrell had not seen as relevant enough to mention in 
the submission.38  This side effect instantly led Kelsey to be suspicious of 
Kevadon.  As she put it, “the peripheral neuritis did not seem the sort of 
side effect that should come from a simple sleeping pill.”39  When she 
addressed the Merrell Company with this concern, Merrell replied that at 
least Kevadon was “safer than barbiturates.”40  
From that point on, Kelsey and the Merrell Company were 
engaged in an openly antagonistic relationship, with Merrell Company 
representatives badgering Kelsey daily, trying to get her to approve 
 Kevadon, and Kelsey doggedly refusing their application every 60 
days.41  Merrell told Kelsey forthright that they wanted to get the drug on 
the market before Christmas, “Because that’s when our best sales are.”42  
As she kept refusing to approve Kevadon, Kelsey also continued to 
                                                 
37 Kriplen, “The Heroine of the FDA.”  
38 Ibid.  
39 McNeill, “The Woman Who Stood Between America and a 
Generation of ‘Thalidomide Babies’:  How the United States Escaped a National 
Tragedy in the 1960s.”  
40 Ibid.  
41  “Government Actions in Times of Crisis:  Lessons from the History 
of Drug Regulation,” 5.  
42 Bren, “Frances Oldham Kelsey,” 24.   
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research its possible effects.  Because of her former research on the 
effects of quinine on embryonic rabbits, she began to wonder if 
thalidomide too was metabolized differently by mothers and their unborn 
children.  Could it possibly be harmless to adults, but damaging to 
fetuses?43  
This war went on for over a year, both sides fighting their battles 
60 days at a time.  The Merrell Company continued to renew their 
application through November, 1961, when the first links between 
thalidomide and fetal abnormalities came to light; however, by April, 
1962, they knew they had been beaten and withdrew their application for 
good.44  In total, there were 17 thalidomide babies born in the United 
States—partially from citizens who had obtained Distaval or Contergan 
abroad and partially from the 2.5 million thalidomide tablets that the 
Merrell Company had distributed on “an investigational basis.”45  The 
end result was a tragedy, certainly for those families, but the overall 
sense in the United States was that a disaster had been narrowly averted.    
Lawmakers seemed to realize how close they had come to catastrophe.  
In October, 1962, the Kefauver-Harris amendment passed, leading to 
stricter FDA regulations on new drugs, as well as regulations about 
informed consent for those who took experimental drugs on a trial 
basis.46  Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey was awarded the President’s Award 
for Distinguished Civilian Service, becoming only the second woman 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 McNeill, “The Woman Who Stood Between America and a 
Generation of ‘Thalidomide Babies’:  How the United States Escaped a National 
Tragedy in the 1960s.” 
45 Bren, “Frances Oldham Kelsey,” 24.  
46 “Government Actions in Times of Crisis:  Lessons from the History 
of Drug Regulation,” 5.   
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ever to receive this honor.47  A year later, she was promoted to the 
position of Chief of the Investigational Drug Branch of the FDA; four 
years after that, she became the Director of the Office of Scientific 
Investigation, a position which she held for 40 more years.48  
The thalidomide tragedy was a sobering check on the unfettered 
progress that had marked the medical field ever since the turn of the 
century.  Soon after 1962, it faded into the background once again, but 
for the victims and their families, life would never be the same again.  
The rest of the world had changed too, albeit in a less dramatic way.  
Instead of looking at drugs as miracles, people became suspicious and 
began to wonder exactly what their doctor was prescribing them.  
Certainly, life had changed forever for drug companies and the FDA— 
following the thalidomide tragedy, drug regulations became stricter than 
ever before in an effort to prevent such a disaster from ever happening 
again.  Ultimately, a drug that had once been hailed as a cure-all became 
synonymous with misinformation and distrust.  Although the United 
States narrowly avoided a full-scale thalidomide tragedy, its drug 
regulation policies would always carry the shadow of thalidomide. 
                                                 
47 McNeill, “The Woman Who Stood Between America and a 
Generation of ‘Thalidomide Babies’:  How the United States Escaped a National 
Tragedy in the 1960s.”  
48 Ibid.  
